The 4–2–3–1 approach: Tactics at the 00' decade
In the past years we’ve seen the 4–2–3–1 becoming such a trend in the football world, but the story is not as unilinear as it sounds. The 4–2–3–1 changed its shape and its roles during these years, in an attempt to create new alternatives and become less predictable on the field. As an starter, one might think the 4–2–3–1 formation is always the same, with 2 wingers or inside forwards and a playmaker in the center, but it has suffered dramatic changes in the way the attack works, aswell the way the players behave on the field.
- > Zidane and his magic
One of the first teams remembered by the use of a 4–2–3–1 was the French national team, which had Zinedine Zidane, a superb playmaker, inside a midfield trio. That team, which won the Euro 2000, worked in a fairly similar manner to a 4–2–1–3, with Dugarry and Djorkaeff playing wide and attacking the box, while Thuram and Lizarazu would bomb forward to provide width. This way, Zidane worked in a pivotal role, to receive the ball and distribute and contribute to the offensive phase, and for that he had the support of two defensive midfielders, Deschamps and Vieira while had always a passing option with the 3 more attacking minded players — Dugarry, Djorkaeff and Henry — .
This type of play created problems to the opponents, specially when playing against teams with 3 at the back, since there would be 3 defenders to mark the three forwards, and, if the wingbacks were too deep, the opponent would have 5 vs 3, but would pretty much lose the midfield battle, making it difficult to get forward and attack in numbers. They would repeat the formation in the 2006 World Cup, but with a different approach, more defensive minded and with Zidane playing free to roam towards space, to get the ball and also to get further forward. The wider players had different roles aswell, instead of being more like wide forwards — like Dugarry and Djorkaeff — , Ribéry and Malouda were pretty much more traditional wingers, even though they were asked to come back so the team would defend in a 4–4–1–1 formation, whilst Sagnol and Abidal, the full backs in that World Cup, had more conservative roles making it a full back four.
- > Cut inside: the 4–2–3–1 in the 2010 World Cup
The 2010 World Cup saw another change in the approach of a 4–2–3–1, while it was being used by almost every squad in the tournament. There were some teams that excelled playing in this formation, the most easy to reckon is the finalists: Spain and the Netherlands. The Dutch team played in a more reactive manner, with two nominal defensive midfielders and pretty much all the creativity was given in the cerebral play of Sneijder, that would play as a number 10 on field, right behind Robin van Persie, who would act moving to channels and opening space for Robben or Kuijt to cut inside and finish towards goal.
Netherlands played this 4–2–3–1 with both Robben and Kuijt coming back in the defensive phase, and van Persie would work more without the ball, not as a typically number 9, who would wait for the ball up, but pressuring defenders and linking play to activate specially Robben and his well known dribbling and finishing. Despite being a primarily reactive side, they had good numbers in possession in the final against a possession hungry spanish side — 43% — . But Iniesta’s brilliance in the extra time made the dutch side go down and without any chance of reaction — at that time already playing with 10 man on the field since Heitinga was sent off at the 4th minute of the second half of extra time.
The spanish 4–2–3–1 worked a bit different than the dutch one, since they lacked a finishing wide forward and their focus on maintaining the possession and pressing higher on the pitch made them maintain their shape, instead of returning to a 4–4–1–1 formation, as their opponents. Yet, their midfield trio was working trying to create passing triangles and a combination of a wide playmaker — Iniesta — , who would come inside and try to create chances, and Pedro, that tried to exploit any space in the area that would appear. The midfield trio would be, that way, kind of narrow to maintain fluidity with the ball. Xavi had a role to get the ball deeper, trying to pass it and move the team higher up on the field, which is significantly different from Sneijder on the Dutch side, who would get the ball and try to activate the runs of Arjen Robben. By the extra-time, the Spanish team would have their midfield trio changed, with the coming in from Jesus Navas — an out-and-out right winger — and Fernando Torres in place of David Villa, so Iniesta was moved to play on the left side of the pitch, from where he, after a series of passings, had cut inside and gone into the area to clinch the title winner in the 11th minute of the extra time’s second half.
That said, one might see the 4–2–3–1 formation was worked in different manners during the decade, adapting not only the football culture from which is brought, but also as a manner to adapt the players and creating trends on how to play with the midfield trio and what kind of football can be played. Whether it was a 3 attacking forwards disguised in a 4–2–1–3, or a with a defensive stance of defending in a 4–4–1–1, the 4–2–3–1 had seen some changes throughout the years, and certainly it only continued in the later years.
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